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E-mail address: wet@physik.uni-marburg.de (W. EIn rivalry, constant stimuli allow several interpretations (‘‘percepts”). Percepts are characterized by their
probability to occur and by the duration of their dominance. During continuous presentation of bi-stable
stimuli, both percept probabilities are trivially 50%. To disentangle the processes triggering a percept
from those stabilizing it, we introduce tri-stable stimuli having three percepts. We ﬁnd the probability
and dominance duration of a percept independently adjustable. Percept probabilities and dominance
durations show mutual dependencies across several perceptual switches. Consequently, the current per-
ceptual experience depends on perceptual history; therefore, rivalry – even for continuous presentation –
is not a memory-less process.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Signals arriving at our sensory system typically contain incom-
plete or ambiguous information about their sources in the real
world. The system is then faced with the challenge to infer a un-
ique and consistent interpretation. If several interpretations are
equally probable, the perceptual experience tends to switch be-
tween several alternatives over time, while at any given time point
one interpretation dominates. This phenomenon, termed rivalry, is
observed for a huge variety of stimuli (Blake and Logothetis (2002)
for review), ranging from geometrical ﬁgures (Necker, 1832; Schrö-
der, 1858), faces (Boring, 1930), structure from motion (Ullman,
1979), binocular (Wheatstone, 1838), tactile (Carter, Konkle, Wang,
Hayward, & Moore, 2008), auditory (Van Noorden, 1975; Warren &
Gregory, 1958), and olfactory stimuli (Zhou & Chen, 2009).
Although these stimuli differ substantially across features and
modalities, they induce a strikingly similar rivalry process: contin-
uous and stochastic perceptual alternations between two interpre-
tations of an ambiguous sensory stimulus (e.g., Brascamp, van Ee,
Pestman, & van den Berg, 2005; Naber, Carter, & Verstraten,
2009; O’Shea, Parker, Rooy, & Alais, 2009; Pressnitzer & Hupé,
2006; Rubin & Hupé, 2005, chap. 8; Sheppard & Pettigrew, 2006).
In rivalry, successive dominance durations (i.e., the time period
a certain percept is visible) are generally considered as indepen-
dent and the exact timing of rivalry switches as unpredictablell rights reserved.
ät Marburg, AG Neurophysik,
x: +49 6421 28 24168.
inhäuser).(Blake, Fox, & McIntyre, 1971; Borsellino, Marco, Allazetta, Rinesi,
& Bartolini, 1972; Fox & Hermann, 1967; Levelt, 1967; Walker,
1975). However, several outwardly accessible physiological mea-
sures, such as eye position, saccades, eye-blinks, and pupil size
have been found to relate to rivalry states (Becher, 1910; Einhäus-
er, Martin, & König, 2004; Einhäuser, Stout, Koch, & Carter, 2008;
Eure, Hamilton, & Pheiffer, 1956; Glen, 1940; Hupé, Lamirel, &
Lorenceau, 2009; Ito et al., 2003; van Dam & van Ee, 2005, 2006;
Wundt, 1898) and may potentially serve as predictors for domi-
nance durations and switch times.
Even without the use of physiological markers, independence
and unpredictability of perceptual states have received consider-
able challenge. By carefully accounting for noise effects in report-
ing the perceptual state, van Ee (2009) has recently reported a
non-zero correlation between successive dominance durations in
rivalry. On long and on very brief time-scales, perceptual history
also is known to affect the speed of rivalry switching: Suzuki and
Grabowecky (2007) ﬁnd a brief initial decrease of dominance dura-
tions during the ﬁrst 6 trials of 20-s rivalry presentations and a fea-
ture-speciﬁc long-lasting effect of daily exposure to a rivalry
stimulus. Most evidence against the stochasticity of rivalry, how-
ever, has resulted from studies using interrupted presentations of
rivalry stimuli. In such a setting the order of percepts and their
dominance durations also contain information about subsequent
percepts (e.g., Brascamp et al., 2008; Maloney, Martello, Sahm, &
Spillmann, 2005; Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). More speciﬁcally, if
a bi-stable stimulus presentation is interrupted by a blank presen-
tation period, the chance that the preceding percept returns after
the blank is related to the length of its previous dominance
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perception that take into account these facts, have denoted a sig-
niﬁcant role of an internal bias and memory (Brascamp, Pearson,
Blake, & van den Berg, 2009; Brascamp et al., 2008; Kanai, Knapen,
van Ee, & Verstraten, 2007; Leopold, Wilke, Maier, & Logothetis,
2002; Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, 2003; Pastukhov &
Braun, 2008). These studies generally imply that a perceptual bias
cumulatively builds up during the dominance periods of a percept
and the larger the bias for this percept (i.e., the longer its preceding
dominance durations), the higher the probability to turn dominant
again after interruption. An exogenously controlled factor, such as
blanking the stimulus, however, may itself affect rivalry dynamics.
Indeed, during discontinuous presentation of bi-stimuli, the pro-
cess of alternations can, depending on the duration of blank inter-
ruptions, either be sped up (Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963) or
slowed down (Leopold et al., 2002). In addition, the effect of an
intermittently presented stimulus depends on whether the inter-
rupting stimulus itself is ambiguous and on its similarity to the
interrupted stimulus. If an ambiguous stimulus interrupts a per-
cept, this percept is less likely to survive as compared to an unam-
biguous interrupting stimulus (Pearson & Clifford, 2005). If the
interrupting and the interrupted are dissimilar, the interruption
has effects comparable to a blank; increasing similarity between
the features of the rivalry stimulus and the interrupter, however,
decreases the survival probability of the percept preceding the
interruption (Kanai et al., 2007; Pearson & Clifford, 2005). The
probability of a percept to survive an interruption furthermore de-
pends on the contrast of the rivalry stimulus (Brascamp, Knapen,
Kanai, van Ee, & van den Berg, 2007). These studies show that
intermittent presentation of a rivalry stimulus reveals important
features about the process of rivalry. However, here we are inter-
ested in the dynamics of rivalry without any exogenous events
(such as interruptions). Hence we here aim at studying effects of
perceptual history on the current perceptual experience by using
the continuous presentation of an uninterrupted stimulus.
Most stimuli used in rivalry research are bi-stable, that is, they
allow exactly two distinct percepts. For continuously presented bi-
stable stimuli, the probability to experience one of the two per-
cepts at an arbitrary point in time is proportional to the average
dominance duration of this percept. Only considering the percept
sequence, both percepts occur equally often (provided the se-
quence is sufﬁciently long to neglect edge effects from start and
end of the sequence). If we refer to the percentage of occasions
in which a percept becomes dominant as percept probability, per-
cept probability will thus be exactly 50% for any uninterrupted bi-
stable stimulus by deﬁnition. (Note that the average time a percept
is dominant, i.e. the dominance duration, is distinct and can be
substantially different between the two percepts of a bi-stable
stimulus.) Hence, the factors underlying the stabilization of a given
percept and those subserving its (re-) occurrence cannot be disen-
tangled in bi-stable stimuli, unless perceptual states are exoge-
nously interrupted. To keep presentation continuous, while
nevertheless dissociating dominance durations from the probabil-
ity of entering a percept, we here use tri-stable stimuli (i.e., ﬁgures
that induce three distinct interpretations of a constant stimulus).
Stimuli with more than two interpretations have been studied
before. Burton (2002) used a quad- (or tetra-)stable perceptual riv-
alry stimulus and showed an effect of instructions on the percept
sequences, but did not report relations between dominance dura-
tions and switches. Other studies on multi-stable stimuli combined
binocular rivalry with other forms of rivalry. O’Shea, Tep, Roeber,
and Schröger (2008) showed different perceptual rivalry stimuli
to each eye to achieve a tri- (to hex-)stable percept (‘‘trinocular riv-
alry”). Suzuki and Grabowecky (2002) asked subjects to report four
different dominance states during bi-stable rivalry in which the
percept could have exclusive dominance (i.e., one eye was fullydominant) or was intermixed with its rival to achieve four different
percepts through instruction. Despite several similarities between
perceptual and binocular rivalry (Andrews & Purves, 1997), both
might differ from each other in other respects, in particular with
regard to the dependence on perceptual history (van Ee, 2009).
Hence it is well conceivable that using binocular rivalry or a com-
bination of binocular and perceptual rivalry stimuli, may yield sub-
stantially different results as compared to using a rivalry stimulus
without binocular conﬂict. To assess whether multi-stable percep-
tion without binocular conﬂict reveals similar dependencies be-
tween dominance durations and transition probabilities, we use
different tri-stable stimuli without inducing binocular rivalry.
With our stimuli, rivalry is either induced in the motion (Exper-
iments 1 and 2) or in the color domain (Experiments 3 and 4).
Within each domain, slight modiﬁcations of the stimulus allow
us to bias the stimulus such that either one of the three percepts
dominates (Experiments 1 and 3) or all are about equally strong
(Experiments 2 and 4). Hence we can measure the relation be-
tween dominance duration and percept probabilities and check
whether any perceptual history effect is contingent on a speciﬁc
parameter choice. In addition to analyzing the sequence of per-
cepts, we measure dependencies between dominance durations
and percept probabilities, and identify a new relation between
these measurements. Our data support the view that, even under
continuous viewing conditions and without binocular conﬂict, riv-
alry is not a memory-less process, but biased by perceptual history.2. Methods
2.1. Observers
Author M.N. and seven naive observers (age 18–31) participated
in each experiment. Observers had normal or corrected to normal
vision. Each observer gave written informed consent to participa-
tion; all procedures adhered to national standards on experiments
with human observers and with the Declaration of Helsinki.2.2. Stimuli
We used four different tri-stable stimuli in four separate exper-
iments. In Experiments 1 and 2, the stimulus was a moving plaid
consisting of two superimposed gratings (Adelson & Movshon,
1983; Wallach, 1935) (Fig. 1A). These plaid stimuli allowed three
distinct alternating percepts: coherent upward motion (U), inco-
herent transparent motion in which the left-ward motion is per-
ceived on top (L), and incoherent transparent motion with
rightward motion on top (R). In Experiment 1 the gratings were
tilted ±120 against the vertical midline. In Experiment 2 the tilt
was increased to ±140. The latter parameter change generally in-
creased the relative stimulus strength of the incoherent sideward
motion percepts. In both experiments, gratings were square-
waves, had a spatial frequency of 0.73 cycles per degree, a peak
luminance (white) of 84.2 cd/m2, a minimum luminance (gray) of
23.3 cd/m2, a 5 circular aperture, and drifted outwards at a speed
of 1.73 deg/s.
Stimuli in Experiments 3 and 4 consisted of three stationary
overlapping color gratings (for bi-stable version: Breese, 1899) in
a 5-degree circular aperture (Fig. 1B). Despite the fact that lumi-
nance remained physically constant throughout the experiment,
the stimulus induced alternating shifts in perceived luminance
per color, with one of the three colored gratings clearly dominating
(i.e., appearing brightest) at any given point in time. Each grating’s
color was produced by a single gun of the screen only. For Experi-
ment 3 the gratings had CIE coordinates (x, y, Y) of (0.623, 0.332,
17.7 cd/m2), (0.298, 0.598, 60.6 cd/m2), and (0.153, 0.068,
A B
Percept A
Percept B
Percept C
di-2 di-1 di
Si-2
Si-1
Si
Time [s]
Switch Back (SB)
Percept A
Percept B
Percept C
di-2 di-1 di
Si-2
Si-1
Si
Time [s]
Switch Forward (SF)
U
L R
U
L R
Stimulus Percepts Stimulus Percepts
C
Fig. 1. Stimuli. (A) Moving plaid stimulus used in Experiments 1 and 2. Two superimposed gratings move sideward, inducing three possible percepts: coherent upward
motion (U), transparent (incoherent) motion with leftward moving grating in front (L), or transparent motion with rightward-moving grating in front (R). (B) Static color
grating stimulus used in Experiments 3 and 4. Perceptually one color grating of the stimulus dominates at any given point in time (red = L, U = green, R = blue). Note that the
ﬁgure’s color and luminance values might differ dramatically from the actual presentation. (C) Considering triplets of percepts, two sequence types can be observed: ‘‘switch
forward” (Si is different from Si2) and ‘‘switch back” (Si is the same as Si2). Si denotes the state (percept), di denotes the corresponding duration of the percept being
dominant (dominance duration), and i denotes the index of the percept in the sequence.
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green grating was lowered to 25.1 cd/m2 with otherwise identical
settings. This made the perceived luminance of the green grating
closer to that of the other gratings and therefore increased the rel-
ative stimulus strength of the red and blue gratings. Gratings were
square-waves and had a spatial frequency of 1 cycle/degree. Orien-
tations relative to the vertical midline were 120 (red grating), 0
(green), and +120 (blue). For consistency of notation with Exper-
iments 1 and 2, we refer to the red, green and blue gratings by their
tilt to the midline, i.e. by L (red), U (green) and R (blue),
respectively.2.3. Setup
Stimuli were generated using Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA)
with its Psychophysics toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997; http://psychtoolbox.org) running on an Optiplex Dell com-
puter and presented with a 21 in. EIZO Flexscan monitor on a gray
background with 1280  1024 pixels at a refresh rate of 100 Hz.
Mean luminance of the background was 23.3 cd/m2, minimum
luminance (black) of the screen as well as ambient light levels were
negligible. Head position was stabilized using a chin and forehead
rest that assured a steady viewing distance of 82 cm.2.4. Procedure
Observers were instructed to indicate the percept by holding
down one of three arrow keys of a USB-gamepad (Left, Up, or Right)
per percept. Observers were asked to always press one button even
if their perceptual dominance was weak. Since during transitions
the button for the preceding percept had to be released, while
the button for the new percept had to be pressed, in the transition
period either two or none of the buttons were pressed. In 30% of
the cases this transition was below the resolution of the input de-vice (36 ms). In the remaining cases, the overlap periods lasted on
average (medians) 80 ms (two buttons, 31% of cases) and 130 ms
(no button, 39% of cases), which is very short compared to the
overall dominance durations (median: 2750 ms). This indicates
that the transitions between percepts were experienced as sharp.
In both cases, the period with two or no button were allotted to
the second percept. Only very rarely (3% of all transitions) did
observers release a button and press the same one again. For the
reported data, we aggregated the periods if the release lasted less
than 10 s and excluded the whole period otherwise. Neither exclu-
sion nor inclusion of all these periods, however, changes any of the
reported results or conclusions (data not shown).
Each experiment consisted of three 5-min blocks. Experiments
were taken on separate days and observers were allowed to take
breaks between blocks. Before the actual experiment observers
were familiarized with the stimuli and apparatus.2.5. Notation
We denote the sequence of perceptual states (‘‘percepts”) by
S1, S2, . . . , SN, where Si 2 fL;U;Rg. The dominance duration corre-
sponding to the ith state is denoted by di. To enable analysis across
observers, we normalized distributions of dominance durations by
dividing them through the median dominance duration within
blocks and observers. These normalized dominance durations are
denoted as di . We also analyzed relative dominance durations;
i.e. how much longer was percept di2 relative to di1. Hence we
deﬁned relative dominance duration as (di2  di1)/(di2 + di1).
The experimental setting only allows transitions between different
states (as same-state transitions, if existent, would not be reported
as ‘‘switch”), that is Si– Si1. Consequently, given Si2 there are
only two alternatives for Si. If Si2 = Si, we will refer to a
(Si2, Si1, Si) triplet as ‘‘switch back” (SB), otherwise we refer to
(Si2– Si) as ‘‘switch forward” (SF, Fig. 1C).
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If rivalry were a memory-less process, the probability to transit
from a current state to another should be independent of any pre-
ceding state other than the current one. In other words, the se-
quence of perceptual states would have the so-called Markov
property. In Appendix, we devised a test of the null-hypothesis that
a given ﬁnite sequence fulﬁlls the Markov property; p-values in
Section 3.4 (denoted as pMarkov to avoid confusion with the transi-
tion probabilities) refer to this test. A low pMarkov implies that the
null-hypothesis, and thus the hypothesis of a memory-less process,
is likely to be refuted.3. Results
3.1. Tri-stable stimuli show the same dominance-duration statistics as
bi-stable stimuli
We investigated tri-stable rivalry with four different stimuli in
four separate experiments. First we assessed, per experiment,
whether general properties of tri-stable stimuli, in particular the
distribution of dominance durations, match those typically ob-
served for bi-stable stimuli. At visual inspection, the sequence of
perceptual states and associated dominance durations appears
irregular and random (Fig. 2A), similar to the typical observation
for bi-stable stimuli. To facilitate comparison and pooling across
observers, we consider normalized dominance durations di (see
Section 2.5; Table 1 for raw durations). As for bi-stable stimuli
the distribution of dominance durations has a leptokurtic (i.e., hea-
vy-tailed) distribution, which can be approximated well by a gam-
ma or a log-normal distribution (Fig. 2B). Hence the 0th order
properties of all our tri-stable stimuli, namely the distribution of
dominance durations, are similar to the bi-stable case.Table 1
Median and standard deviation of dominance durations for individuals and number of occ
Experiment
1
FP FR KG KL
L 3.89 ± 2.24
(061)
1.94 ± 1.14
(067)
1.76 ± 1.92
(096)
2.17 ± 1.22
(079)
U 3.34 ± 6.53
(084)
6.43 ± 5.11
(077)
3.29 ± 3.05
(099)
3.62 ± 2.67
(115)
R 3.32 ± 2.67
(055)
1.82 ± 1.30
(077)
2.04 ± 1.83
(097)
2.19 ± 1.63
(083)
Experiment
2
L 4.83 ± 3.78
(079)
1.34 ± 0.80
(177)
1.68 ± 1.86
(136)
1.94 ± 2.25
(123)
U 1.62 ± 2.55
(054)
3.17 ± 1.78
(085)
2.78 ± 2.59
(083)
2.77 ± 2.22
(078)
R 3.63 ± 2.88
(063)
1.39 ± 0.85
(197)
1.78 ± 1.95
(122)
1.85 ± 1.85
(116)
Experiment
3
AP AR AV CP
L 2.66 ± 2.09
(084)
2.66 ± 4.11
(037)
1.43 ± 11.54
(036)
2.12 ± 1.15
(102)
U 3.38 ± 2.64
(112)
9.31 ± 9.77
(039)
3.48 ± 14.12
(042)
3.48 ± 1.84
(115)
R 1.81 ± 2.13
(075)
6.25 ± 6.61
(018)
1.41 ± 13.58
(045)
2.46 ± 1.20
(077)
Experiment
4
L 3.33 ± 2.93
(117)
5.10 ± 8.91
(039)
1.84 ± 3.53
(052)
2.34 ± 0.93
(111)
U 1.45 ± 0.94
(076)
6.92 ± 13.17
(041)
3.71 ± 11.55
(062)
2.89 ± 1.45
(143)
R 2.33 ± 1.81
(108)
3.10 ± 3.81
(026)
1.61 ± 6.05
(042)
2.19 ± 0.90
(086)3.2. Dominance durations and percept probabilities are independently
adjustable
In bi-stable stimuli the probability of both percepts to occur in
the sequence is exactly 50% (neglecting initial/ﬁnal percept). In tri-
stable stimuli, however, percept probabilities may range from near
0 (only the other two percepts are observed) to 50% (the percept
re-occurs after every other switch). Dominance durations, in turn,
need not be coupled to these percept probabilities (consider for
illustration a case, where the sequence of percepts is ABACABACA,
but B’s and C’s duration is twice that of A’s). If the processes under-
lying stabilization and (re-)occurrence of a percept, however,
would be the same, we would predict percept probabilities and
dominance durations to be proportional to each other. To test this
hypothesis, we analyze whether stimulus parameters can adjust
percept probability independently from average dominance dura-
tion. First, we compare the two drifting plaid stimuli (Experiments
1 and 2). In Experiment 1, both the mean dominance duration of
the up-percept (Fig. 2C) and its probability (Fig. 2D) are higher than
the other two percepts. Note that compared to Experiment 1, the
motion direction of the gratings was deliberately changed to
‘‘weaken” the U percept in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, how-
ever, the up-percept still has (marginally) the highest average
dominance duration, while it occurs substantially less frequent
than the left and right percept.
Consequently – although we cannot exclude some coupling be-
tween dominance duration and percept probability; the relation
that trivially holds in the bi-stable case, does indeed not hold for
tri-stable rivalry. We observe a similar result for the color stimuli
of Experiments 3 and 4. The U percept is dominant in both mean
dominance duration and percept probability in Experiment 3. In
contrast, the U percept still has signiﬁcantly higher dominance
durations in Experiment 4, but is only second to the L percept inurrences.
MH MN MtH SG
3.27 ± 1.88
(084)
1.91 ± 0.91
(101)
1.06 ± 3.81
(056)
4.09 ± 12.0
(025)
4.71 ± 4.75
(072)
3.93 ± 2.14
(108)
3.19 ± 6.75
(092)
19.6 ± 15.2
(025)
2.41 ± 1.72
(063)
2.38 ± 1.12
(092)
0.99 ± 3.59
(066)
5.38 ± 3.44
(018)
3.36 ± 3.22
(096)
2.57 ± 1.36
(118)
2.93 ± 2.68
(104)
6.20 ± 10.7
(027)
4.40 ± 2.64
(028)
2.18 ± 1.25
(102)
1.10 ± 2.07
(094)
14.2 ± 13.3
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2.45 ± 3.35
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3.00 ± 2.07
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1.02 ± 0.56
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0.94 ± 2.33
(062)
2.31 ± 3.60
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1.31 ± 3.59
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1.28 ± 0.80
(205)
2.13 ± 3.93
(130)
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1.19 ± 2.18
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Fig. 2. (A) Example sequence of reported percepts over time (observer KL in ﬁrst block of Experiment 1), illustrating the seemingly stochastic nature of rivalry. (B)
Distribution of normalized dominance durations, pooled across observers and normalized to unit integral (probability densities). Gamma (black) and log-normal (gray)
distributions are shown with the same mean and variance as empirical data. (C) Median and standard error of pooled normalized dominance durations per percept. Since
dominance duration distributions are non-Gaussian (panel B), signiﬁcance markers refer to a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on equality of medians. (D) Probabilities for each
percept to occur, data pooled across observes.
822 M. Naber et al. / Vision Research 50 (2010) 818–828terms of percept probability. Again, percept probability and domi-
nance duration are not proportional. In conclusion, the processes
determining the probability of a percept to occur and the processes
subserving the persistence of its dominance are – at least partly –
distinct.
3.3. First-order transition probabilities
For all experiments, we analyzed the ﬁrst-order transition prob-
abilities between the three percepts (Fig. 3). No comparable mea-
sure exists for continuously presented bi-stable stimuli, as the
probability to switch to the other percept is always 1 if only two
percepts exist. In the tri-stable case, however it is relevant to seeL R
U
L R
U
.58
.42
.46
.54
.39
.61
.37
.63
.50
.50
.72
.28
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Fig. 3. First-order transition probabilities between the different percepts for the four dif
probabilities.whether certain transitions are preferred. As illustrative example,
consider a case in which all percepts had equal occurrence proba-
bility. With this example all transition probabilities could be 0.5,
but, on the other extreme, could also be 1 for L? R, R? U,
U? L and 0 for the other (L? U, U? R, R? L). In the former case,
switch back and switch forward would be equally likely, while in
the later case only switches forward would exist.
In Experiment 1 (Fig. 3, left), it is more likely to switch from an
incoherent percept (L or R) to the coherent percept (U) than be-
tween the incoherent percepts. This is not surprising, given that
the U percept is most probable to occur (Fig. 2D). Conversely, in
Experiment 2 the transition from incoherent to coherent is less
likely than between incoherent percepts, although there is a slightL R
U
L R
U
.63
.37
.39
.61
.37
.63
.56
.44
.32
.68
.48
.52
Experiment 4Experiment 3
ferent experiments, data pooled across all observers. Gray value of arrows indicates
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Experiment 3 there is a bias to switch from U to L (rather than to
R), while in Experiments 1 and 2 the incoherent to coherent tran-
sition probability is independent of whether the incoherent per-
cept was L or R (Fig. 3, 3rd from left). The preference to go from
U to L is preserved in Experiment 4 (Fig. 3, right). In both cases this
is consistent with the overall more likely occurrence of L as com-
pared to R (Fig. 2D). In sum, there is an effect of stimulus properties
on ﬁrst-order transition probabilities. However, this effect is
mostly accounted for by the effects on the (0th order) percept
probabilities and beyond this, there is no evident preference for
any speciﬁc ﬁrst-order transition.
3.4. The sequence of percepts is non-Markovian
If rivalry were a memory-less process, percept sequences in-
duced by the tri-stable stimuli should have the Markov property
(cf. Section 2). To test this, we calculated for each possible triplet
(see Appendix) the probability that a particular sequence is Mar-
kovian (pMarkov). When calculating pMarkov for all observers and
experiments, we ﬁnd that in Experiment 1, the null-hypothesis of
the sequence being Markovian can be refuted (at pMarkov < 0.05)
in 4 out of 8 observers (Fig. 4, top-left). In Experiment 2 even 6
out of 8 observers violate the Markov assumption (Fig. 4, top-
right). With the exception of observer KG in Experiment 1, the vio-
lation consistently occurs when U is the intermediate percept (Si1)
in a triplet sequence (Si2, Si1, Si) and is symmetrical with respect
to the two possibilities for Si2. In all signiﬁcant cases (at p < 0.05)FP FR KG KL MH MN MtH
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Fig. 4. Estimated p-values for the null-hypothesis that a sequence of perceptual states h
particular transition per experiment and observer. A bar exceeding the p = .05 line indi
probability to switch from the current percept (Si1) to the next percept (Si) depends on
towards the top (log10 p represented).the switch forward is more likely than the switch back. Again for 3/
8 observers in Experiment 3 (Fig. 4, bottom-left) and 4/8 observers
in Experiment 4 (Fig. 4, bottom-right) the Markov property is vio-
lated. Since we perform 192 individual comparisons, (4 experi-
ments  8 observers  6 transitions), an adjustment of the alpha
level of the test is needed. When adjusting the expected false dis-
covery rate (FDR) to 0.05 by using the Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) method, the corrected level across all experiments is
0.006. Using this corrected level, we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant prefer-
ences for the switch forward in 3/8 observers in each experiment.
It should be noted that the lack of signiﬁcant Markov violation
in the remaining observers does not imply that their sequences are
indeed Markovian. First, we only checked violations of the Markov
property in the transitions up to Si2. Second, for particularly short
sequences, like in observer SG with only 66 switches, the statistical
power to reject the Markov assumption is low. In sum, we ﬁnd the
Markov property to be violated in all experiments, which is clear
evidence against a memory-less process in continuous rivalry.
3.5. Dominance durations are inﬂuenced by the preceding percept
Next we address whether the dominance duration of a given
percept depends on which percept preceded it. Again, this question
cannot be posed for continuous presentation of a bi-stable stimu-
lus, as there is only one possible preceding percept. Separately
for each experiment and each percept (L, U, R), we compared the
median dominance durations between the two different preceding
percepts (Fig. 5). Since the distributions of dominance durations05
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as the Markov property (i.e., is memory-less). Each bar represents the data of one
cates that for this particular sequence, the Markov assumption is violated and the
the preceding percept (Si2). The y-scale is logarithmic and signiﬁcance increases
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Fig. 5. Boxplots of median normalized dominance durations (di ) per experiment. Any difference within a pair of bars indicates that the median dominance duration (d

i ) of the
current percept (Si) depends on the preceding percept (Si1). Current percept is labeled on x-axis, the preceding percept (Si1) is encoded by gray values (legend on top). Boxes
represent the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile of the data, whiskers the extent of the data. Signiﬁcance markers refer to uncorrected results of two-sided Wilcoxon
test on equality of the medians.
824 M. Naber et al. / Vision Research 50 (2010) 818–828are non-Gaussian, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test for the com-
parison of medians is used. In all experiments, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
effect of the preceding percept on median dominance duration for
at least one of the percepts. In Experiment 1, the incoherent per-
cepts (L or R) are signiﬁcantly longer when preceded by the coher-
ent (U) percept than when preceded by the other incoherent (R or
L) percept (Fig. 5 left panel; p = 7.65  104 for Si = L, p = 0.04 for
Si = R). The same and even stronger pattern is observed for Exper-
iment 2 (Fig. 5, 2nd panel from left; p = 1.99  105 for Si = L,
p = 9.81  1011 for Si = R). In Experiments 3 and 4, when there is
no obvious hierarchy of the percepts (coherent versus incoherent),
we nonetheless observe a similar dependence of the dominance
duration on the preceding percept for some percepts (Fig. 5 right
panels; Experiment 3: p = 8.79  103 for Si = U; Experiment 4:
p = 4.90  103 for Si = L: p = 7.31  103 for Si = U). Note that while
the reported p-values are uncorrected, all but one of the signiﬁcant
effects survive an individual Bonferoni-adjustment within each
experiment (0.05/3 = 0.0016) and most of the signiﬁcant effectsExperiment 1
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(Si2, Si1) as given in the legend on top. Points above the diagonal imply higher duratio
whose dominance durations are considered (Si2, Si1), are identical on both axes, onlysurvive an adjustment to an expected FDR of 5% across all experi-
ments (adjusted alpha level: 0.0088). In sum, there is a signiﬁcant
dependence of dominance duration on the preceding percept.
3.6. Subsequent percept depends on preceding dominance durations
We have demonstrated that dominance durations depend on
the preceding percept. Does in turn the probability to switch to a
certain percept depend on the dominance durations of the preced-
ing percepts? To answer this question, we consider the effect of
preceding dominance durations on the subsequent switch proba-
bility in triplets of percepts: for an identical pair of Si2 and Si1
(i.e., identical 2nd order history) does Si depend on di1 and/or
di2? As before, we compare two distinct cases (Fig. 1C): the switch
back (SB, Si = Si2) and the switch forward (SF, Si– Si2) across all
experiments and all (Si2, Si1) pairs (4  6 = 24 data points). To
achieve sufﬁcient amounts of data, we pool across all observers
and consider normalized dominance durations di . If switch-0.5 0.5
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ns for switches forward. Note that for each data point the two preceding percepts,
the current state (Si) differs between the axes.
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cepts, then we would expect that the median dominance duration
per condition is different between the switch back triplets and
switch forward triplets. Data show that for switches back the dom-
inance duration di1 is longer than for switches forward in 18/24
cases (points below diagonal in Fig. 6, left panel). This fraction is
signiﬁcantly larger than expected by chance, even when the abso-
lute size of the durations is neglected (p = 0.02, sign-test). Con-
versely, di2 is shorter if Si1? Si is a switch back than if it is a
switch forward (22/24 cases, Fig. 6 middle, p = 3.6  105). The rel-
ative dominance duration (di2  di1)/(di2 + di1), which was
computed individually at each switch and thus not affected by nor-
malization, conﬁrms this result (Fig. 6, right): in 21/24 cases, a
longer di2 (as compared to the following di1) is observed for
switches back than for switches forward. In sum, this shows that
the shorter a percept has lasted and the more time has elapsed
since it disappeared, the more likely it is to reappear. This result
is consistent with a slowly adapting bias that persists across sev-
eral percepts and is not reset by a perceptual switch.4. Discussion
To dissociate the probability of a certain percept to occur from
the duration of its dominance, we introduced tri-stable stimuli. In-
deed, dominance duration and occurrence probability can – at least
to some extent – be adjusted independently of each other. Further-
more, the sequence of percepts is non-Markovian. This implies that
the perceptual history of at least two percepts back inﬂuence the
current perceptual experience. Further analysis revealed that also
dominance durations and percept probabilities are coupled across
subsequent perceptual states, extending previous work on multi-
stable perception. These effects were independent of stimulus do-
main (motion or color) or speciﬁc stimulus features (i.e., motion
direction and color luminance), and insensitive to the relative
strength of the percepts. In sum, we ﬁnd that perceptual state
and dominance durations are related to more than just the current
and immediately preceding state. Hence, we demonstrate – for the
ﬁrst time during continuous presentation of an unchanged stimu-
lus without binocular conﬂict – that neither the sequence of per-
cepts nor their dominance durations are generated by memory-
less processes; instead both are biased by perceptual history.
In our Experiments 1 and 2, dominance durations of the inco-
herent percepts (L, R) were signiﬁcantly shorter if preceded by
the other incoherent percept (R, L) as compared to being preceded
by the coherent percept (U). One possible interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that switches between percepts of different quality
(here: coherent versus incoherent) prolong the subsequent domi-
nance duration. Such an interpretation would be in line with a
high-level ‘‘fatigue” (adaptation) account of rivalry (Attneave,
1971; Blake, 1989; Lehky, 1988; Taylor & Aldridge, 1974): stimuli
with more similar properties fatigue overlapping neuronal popula-
tions. It should be noted, however, that adaptation in a single pop-
ulation of neurons with simple direction preferences (‘‘component
cells”) would generate the opposite prediction: by itself upward
motion is more similar to left- and rightward motion than the
two side-wards directions are to each other. Neurons reﬂecting
the percept (rather than only the stimulus) with – say – a left-ward
motion preference would also partially encode the U percept. They
should therefore be adapted more by U than by R, and thus an L
percept following a U percept should be comparably shorter. In-
stead our ﬁndings require distinct populations for encoding U, L
and R. Higher areas in the dorsal stream of visual cortex (such as
MT) indeed tend to code coherent pattern motion separately from
component motion, while lower areas such as V1 almost exclu-
sively encode the components (Gizzi, Katz, Schumer, & Movshon,1990; Movshon, Adelson, Gizzi, & Newsome, 1985). A fatigue ac-
count of rivalry thus – at least for the plaid stimulus – would need
to involve not only early visual areas but also higher areas. This ar-
gues in favor of rivalry originating at more than one level of the vi-
sual hierarchy (Blake & Logothetis, 2002).
In rivalry, the function of interruptions is an ongoing puzzle. It
is known that interruptions tend to stabilize the percept (Leopold
et al., 2002), although this effect reverses when interruptions are
sufﬁciently short (Orbach et al., 1963). In the present context it is
tempting to speculate that the middle percept of each triplet acts
as endogenous analogue to the exogenous interruption with re-
spect to the other two percepts. At ﬁrst glance our results support
this interpretation: a longer di1 (equivalent to the interruption)
makes switches back more likely (Figs. 4 and 6). However, some re-
cent studies have found a positive correlation between the proba-
bility of a percept to ‘‘survive” after an interruption and the
preceding duration of its dominance (Brascamp et al., 2008;
Pastukhov & Braun, 2008). In the ‘‘middle percept (Si1) equals
interruption” interpretation, this would predict a positive relation
between the duration of di2 and the probability to switch back,
contrary to our actual ﬁndings. Nonetheless, the present results
might provide some hint on the role of interruptions. In the view
that prolonged experience of a percept makes it less likely to re-
turn to a percept without actively destabilizing it, a short blank
would render a switch more likely (one cannot return to the per-
cept after the blank), while a long blank allows for recovery. In
any case, our results are in line with the general ﬁnding of Bras-
camp et al. (2008) and Pastukhov and Braun (2008) in that percep-
tual history modulates percept probabilities. Our stimuli in
Experiments 1 and 2 as well as in Experiments 3 and 4 differ only
in one feature value (the relative direction of the drifting gratings
and the luminance of the green grating). These subtle differences
mainly reduce the relative bias towards one dominant percept.
However, we also observe that the coupling between state and
subsequent dominance duration becomes somewhat more pro-
nounced (Fig. 5). Since the feature change affects both the inter-
rupting and the interrupted percept, this effect might be related
to the ﬁndings that survival probabilities are modulated by stimu-
lus features (Brascamp et al., 2007) and by the similarity between
interrupted and interrupting percept (Kanai et al., 2007; Pearson &
Clifford, 2005). To assess the role of feature similarity and to fully
uncover the role of the interruptions as compared to intervening
(‘‘middle”) percepts, a combination of tri-stable rivalry and inde-
pendently varied interruptions seem a promising approach, which
is, however, beyond the scope of the present study.
The dissociation of percept probabilities and dominance dura-
tions suggests that at least partially distinct processes are respon-
sible for either. In other words, there is a different mechanism
determining whether a percept is (initially) chosen as compared
to those controlling its persistency. Interestingly, this qualitative
distinction has been predicted by a theoretical account of rivalry
(Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van Wezel, 2007) that models initial choice
of percept and later switches without the necessity for a high-level
decision stage. Although this model aims primarily at explaining
the effect of stimulus interruptions, an extension to the tri-stable
case is well conceivable.
Multi-stable stimuli with more than two percepts have been de-
scribed earlier (Burton, 2002; O’Shea, Tep, Roeber, & Schröger,
2008; Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2002), but either included binocular
rivalry or were designed for different analyses. Closely related to
the current study is the phenomenon of ‘‘trapping” described by
Suzuki and Grabowecky (2002). In a tetra-stable (four percepts)
condition, these authors ﬁnd a violation of the Markov property
(‘‘path dependence” in their terms). In addition, they report an in-
creased probability to stay within a pair of percepts. The probabil-
ity to stay in this ‘‘trap” decreases with the length of the ‘‘trapped”
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Fig. 7. Example to illustrate the test for Markov property in Experiment 2, data from observer KL. Colored dots show the actual data for the conditional switch probabilities;
heat maps represent a histogram of the results for 105 simulated surrogate sequences that share length (N = 456) and ﬁrst-order transition probabilities with the actual data.
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the trapped sequence. This result argued in favor of a long-term
(‘‘post-selection”) adaptation, but against an adaption of the cur-
rently available stimulus. The method employed by Suzuki and
Grabowecky (2002) is different from the one used here in various
respects. Most importantly, these authors used binocular conﬂict,
while in our paradigm rivalry is purely perceptual. Furthermore,
they separated ‘‘exclusive” from ‘‘intermixed” percepts by instruc-
tion, thus combining binocular rivalry with binding features into
objects. Our stimuli, in turn, operate in distinct feature domains
(motion or color). Despite obvious commonalities, it is unclear, to
what extent binocular rivalry and perceptual rivalry are compara-
ble; these potential differences particularly pertain to the depen-
dence on perceptual history (van Ee, 2009) and to the transition
between dominant states, which in binocular rivalry often spreads
in wave-like manner (Wilson, Blake, & Lee, 2001) and is feature-
dependent (Knapen, van Ee, & Blake, 2007; Naber et al., 2009). In
the light of these differences it is remarkable that Suzuki and Grab-
owecky (2002) arrive at similar conclusions. First, both studies ob-
serve a violation of the Markov property (‘‘path dependence” in
Suzuki & Grabowecky’s terms, Fig. 4). Second, we ﬁnd a depen-
dence of the switch probability on dominance durations of preced-
ing percepts (Fig. 6), which is well in line with Suzuki &
Grabowecky’s ﬁnding of ‘‘post-selection” adaptation. In conjunc-
tion with Suzuki & Grabowecky’s (2002) results, our data suggest
the following interpretation: experiencing a certain percept does
not per se destabilize it (simple adaptation); instead, prolonged
experiencing of a percept reduces the probability to return to this
percept once it has been left (thus the dependence on di2. in
Fig. 6). This reduction in probability then relaxes over time (thus
the converse dependence on di1 in Fig. 6). In the case of trapping,
the reduction in the probability to switch back to the preceding
percept is most evident for transition between closely related per-
cepts, which – after a while in the trap – can drop below the be-
tween-trap transition probability and thereby release trapping
(Fig. 6 in Suzuki & Grabowecky’s study). Our results both conﬁrm
and generalize these earlier results for multi-stable stimuli without
binocular conﬂict.
The trapping phenomenon depends on the similarity between
percepts and can be affected dramatically by comparably subtle
changes of instruction (Burton, 2002). Consequently, it is impor-
tant to show that the effect of perceptual history on the currentpercept does not need a particular trapping pattern. By varying
stimulus parameters, we here modulate several of the parameters
affected by trapping: dominance durations, percept probabilities
and ﬁrst-order transition probabilities. Since results on perceptual
history, in particular the coupling between dominance durations
and percept probability, are qualitatively similar across all our
experiments, our ﬁndings also generalize beyond the trapping
stimuli.
In sum, we ﬁnd effects of perceptual history on the current per-
ceptual experience. This history dependence is reﬂected in percept
probabilities, dominance durations and the coupling between the
two across subsequent percepts. This general ﬁnding is neither
contingent on binocular conﬂict nor on trapping. Taken together
with the aforementioned studies, our results therefore demon-
strate that the dependence of the present perceptual experience
on perceptual history is a general property of rivalry, which is inde-
pendent of whether rivalry is induced through binocular conﬂict,
motion, shape or color. This is further support for the view that riv-
alry is to some extent predictable by perceptual history, occurs at
multiple levels of perception with similar properties, and that the
encoding and eventual resolution of rivalry might be as ubiquitous
in the sensory systems as ambiguity is in real-world stimuli.Acknowledgment
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A.1. Test for Markov property
To consider a process memory-less, the sequence of perceptual
states S1, S2, . . . , SN would need to fulﬁll the Markov property. That
is, the conditional probability of a state Si may only depend on the
directly preceding state Si1 but not on any other preceding state Sj
(j– i, j– i  1), that is p(Si|Si1) = p(Si|S0, . . . , Si1). In other words,
if the Markov property is fulﬁlled, this conditional probability
would be the same independent of preceding sequences. In the
present context, we considered triplets of sequences which could
M. Naber et al. / Vision Research 50 (2010) 818–828 827only either constitute an SB – (C, B, C) – or an SF – (A, B, C) with
C– A (Fig. 1C). If the Markov property holds, it follows that
pðSi ¼ CjSi1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ CÞ ¼ pðSi ¼ CjSi1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ AÞ ½C – A:
By the deﬁnition of the conditional probability this can be
rewritten (under the assumption that p(Si1 = B, Si2 = A)– 0 and
p(Si1 = B, Si2 = C)– 0):
pðSi ¼ C;Si1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ CÞ
pðSi1 ¼ B;Si2¼CÞ ¼
pðSi ¼ C;Si1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ AÞ
pðSi1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ AÞ ð1Þ
or for the counts of the respective triplets and pairs in the sequence:
#ðSi ¼ C;Si1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ CÞ
#ðSi1 ¼ B;Si2¼CÞ ¼
#ðSi ¼ C;Si1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ AÞ
#ðSi1 ¼ B;Si2 ¼ AÞ ð2Þ
The discrepancy between the left-hand side (LHS) and right-
hand side (RHS) of Eq. (2) provides a measure as to what extent
a sequence of perceptual states violates the Markov property. Even
if a Markov process underlies the generation of state sequences,
only inﬁnite sequences will be guaranteed to fulﬁll Eqs. (1) and
(2) perfectly. For ﬁnite sequences deviations from Eqs. (1) and (2)
are to be expected due to random ﬂuctuations. Since the length
of an observed sequence is necessarily ﬁnite, we thus need a base-
line to estimate which discrepancy from Eq. (2) can be expected for
a ﬁnite sequence by chance. Accordingly, we tested the Markov
property by computing the discrepancy between the conditional
probability p(Si|Si1, Si2) of SB and SF triplets of subsequent states
(Si2, Si1, Si). We exemplify this procedure for observer KL in
Experiment 2 for the pair (Si1, Si) = (U, R). This analysis shows that
the switch back is less likely than the switch forward (Fig. 7A, dot),
that is p(Si = R|Si1 = U, Si2 = R) < p(Si = R|Si1 = U, Si2 = L). Conse-
quently, in this example the Markov property is clearly violated.
To assert the signiﬁcance of this discrepancy, we compared it with
a baseline, that is the same discrepancy computed on simulated se-
quences. To compute this baseline, we performed 105 simulations
for each observer and experiment to create surrogate sequences
under the Markov assumption, whose ﬁrst-order transition proba-
bilities p(Si|Si1) and sequence lengths were matched to the actual
data. When testing for the Markov assumption, the data for most of
these simulated chains falls closer to the diagonal than the actual
data (histogram represented as heat map in Fig. 7). In the example
of observer KL 99,934 of 100,000 simulated chains fall closer to the
diagonal than the actual data, yielding an estimate for the proba-
bility of p = 1  99,934/100,000 = 6.6  104 that the actual data
can occur under a Markov assumption. In contrast, when compar-
ing a switch back and a switch forward for the data for
(Si1, Si) = (R, U) in the same observer (Fig. 7B, dot), there is no evi-
dence against the Markov assumption, as estimating the p-value
from the respective simulations yields p = 1  13,644/
100,000 = 0.86. These p-values provided an estimate of the proba-
bility to obtain the actual sequence from a Markov process. Hence
the fraction will be referred to as pMarkov and indicates the signiﬁ-
cance level for the null-hypothesis that the state sequence has the
Markov property. These data are given for all observers, transitions
and experiments in Fig. 4 of Section 3.References
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